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Introduction
In a pioneering paper that extends their static analysis of cost regulation (La ont and Tirole [2] ) to a dynamic framework, La ont and Tirole [3] study a two-period principal/agent model in which the principal cannot commit himself to second-period actions and the agent's type space is a continuum. In the rst period, the principal o ers an incentive scheme and observes the agent's performance (cost), which depends on the agent's ability and rst-period e ort (both of which are unobservable). In the second period, the principal is allowed to update the incentive scheme, and the agent is free to accept the new scheme or to quit. Even though they are not able to characterize the whole set of feasible incentive schemes and solve for the optimal contract, some important properties are derived. First, they show that for any given rst-period incentive scheme, there exists no separating continuation equilibrium; hence, some pooling is necessary in equilibrium. Moreover, they show that when the uncertainty about the agent's ability is small, the equilibrium must involve a large amount of pooling (to be de ned in the next section), but it is not necessary to be a partition equilibrium. They construct a nonpartition continuation equilibrium for a given rst-period menu with two contracts and conjecture that this continuation equilibrium need not be suboptimal for small uncertainty.
We demonstrate that, whether the uncertainty is small or not, La ont and Tirole's menu of contracts, giving rise to a nonpartition continuation equilibrium, is not optimal.
To do this, we construct two rst-period incentive schemes leading to partition continu-ation equilibria and show that one of the two partition continuation equilibria gives the principal higher payo s. The intuition of our proof comes from the trade-o between e ciency distortion and the information rent e ect.
Nearly two decades after their publication, no one has been able to fully characterize the whole set of incentive contracts and solve for the optimal dynamic contract. The di culty arises from the failure of the revelation principle in repeated relationships without commitment caused by the ratchet e ect. Recognizing the di culty of probing for a full characterization of equilibria, some authors focus their analyses on dynamic contracting without commitment in a restricted class of equilibria. Caillaud and Mezzetti [1] study equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions. They analyze the equilibrium reserve prices in the set of \equilibria with separation under participation."
An equilibrium with separation under participation is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which in the rst period bidders with valuations above some threshold v follow a symmetric, strictly increasing bidding strategy, and bidders with valuations below v do not participate. 1 They show that in equilibrium the seller chooses the rst-auction reserve price to induce a positive measure of bidder types to participate, but the measure of participating types is smaller than in a one-shot auction. Sun [5] studies dynamic price discrimination and quality provision with customer recognition. Within the class of partition equilibria, he shows that in equilibrium the rm nds it optimal to o er a single contract in the rst period when the social surplus function is log submodular or 1 Notice that the partition property of the continuation equilibrium is implied by the assumption of symmetry, as all types who choose not to participate are below v : consumers are patient. Moreover, if the rm's optimal strategy is to o er a single contract in the rst period, then the rm chooses to serve fewer consumers than in the static setup, and some consumers downgrade the product in the second period. Hence solving for the optimal contract in repeated relationships without commitment is possible if we impose the symmetry or partition assumption in equilibrium. However, can we justify restricting the analysis to the set of partition equilibria? Some possible justi cations will be discussed in the next section. This note proceeds as follows. In the next section, we introduce the static model and summarize the main results obtained by La ont and Tirole [2] . In section 3, we brie y introduce the dynamic model and present the nonpartition equilibrium constructed by La ont and Tirole, and show that it is suboptimal. Section 4 concludes.
The Static Model
Consider a regulator who wants to ask a rm to implement a valuable indivisible project.
The cost of the project depends on the rm's e ciency type and the e ort level e performed by the rm's manager. Speci cally, the cost structure of the project is
The regulator can observe the realized cost c; but not the rm's type or e ort level e. The rm knows its own type , and the regulator believes that is distributed on [ ; ] with strictly positive density f ( ) and cumulative distribution F ( ); all of which is common knowledge: We assume that the hazard rate is monotone, i.e., By invoking the revelation principle, the envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal [4] ) and integration by parts, we obtain the following results that will be used frequently in the proof of Lemma 1:
Proposition 1 (La ont and Tirole [2] ) (i) The regulator's problem is equivalent to picking a nondecreasing function e( ) : [ ; ] ! R to maximize the following objective function:
The optimal solution e ( ) solves the following equation
Example of a Nonpartition Equilibrium
Now we brie y introduce the two-period version of the static model and discuss La ont and Tirole's example of a nonpartition equilibrium. The timing of the two-period game is as follows: (i) In the rst period, the regulator chooses a menu of contracts C 1 R 2 ; and the rm, after observing its type, picks a contract in C 1 . (ii) The regulator observes the contract (performance) taken by the rm in the rst period, and (iii) he then chooses the second-period menu C 2 optimally given his beliefs about the rm's type after observing its rst-period choice. (iv) Finally, the rm makes its second-period choice in C 2 . Let (s 1 (c( )); c 1 ( )) 2 C 1 denote the contract taken by rm in the rst period. De ne
; c 1 ( ))g; the set of types that choose the same contract as type does in the rst period. Then fA( )g 2[ ; ] is a partition of the type space [ ; ]. 3 Let C 2A R 2 denote the set of contracts o ered by the regulator to segment A in the second period and S 2 (c 2 ( jA)); c 2 ( jA)) 2 C 2A the contract taken by rm 2 A in the second period. The regulator acts to maximize the discounted value of the social surplus W 1 + W 2 , and the rm maximizes 1 + 2 ; where is a common discount factor with 0 < < 1. We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept. First, we give some de nitions.
De nition 1 For a given C 1 ; a continuation equilibrium is a PBE for the subgame following C 1 :
De nition 2 A continuation equilibrium is called a partition equilibrium if the number of segments in the partition fA( )g 2[ ; ] induced by C 1 is countable and each segment is connected. 
In contrast to the static model in which the optimal incentive scheme is to fully separate the types under a mild condition (see (ii) in Proposition 1), La ont and Tirole demonstrate that in the dynamic model, for any given C 1 ; there exists no continuation equilibrium that fully separates types in the rst period. Hence some pooling is required in equilibrium. Moreover, they show that \much pooling" is necessary when the uncertainty is small ( small), as can be seen in the following proposition. To do this, they consider a sequence of economies with xed and let the lower bound of the interval n converge to (the density is obtained by successive truncations of the initial density):
Proposition 2 (La ont and Tirole [3] ) For any " > 0; there exists " < such that for any n such that n " ; the equilibrium of the game on [ n ; ] must either (i) involve at least a fraction (1 ") of rms producing at the same cost in the rst period or (ii) exhibit both in nite reswitching and pooling over a large scale (1 ") properties.
Therefore when the uncertainty is small, this proposition tells us that the equilibrium must either be almost a fully pooling equilibrium or exhibit some sort of complexity It can also be shown that c and e c can be chosen arbitrarily close (by choosing e close to ); hence, a priori, this equilibrium need not be suboptimal for small uncertainty.
In the following, however, we show that this conjecture is incorrect. First, we introduce the nonpartition continuation equilibrium that they construct. Assume the game has the following structure: a quadratic disutility of e ort (e) = e 2 =2; 
It can be readily seen that this continuation equilibrium exhibits in nite reswitching and pooling over a large scale (1 ") properties.
In order to show that the nonpartition continuation equilibrium induced by C N P 1 is not optimal, we consider two alternative menus, C P 1 1 and C P 2 1 : First let us describe C P 1 1 and its continuation equilibrium. C P 1 1 consist of two contracts: C By computing the welfare for these three continuation equilibria, we show that one or the other partition continuation equilibrium is necessarily better than the nonpartition continuation equilibrium induced by C N P 1 : Let W N P 1 + W N P 2 denote the discounted value of the social surplus in the nonpartition continuation equilibrium, W P 1 1 + W P 1 2 the discounted value of the social surplus in the rst partition continuation equilibrium, and W P 2 1 + W P 2 2 the discounted value of the social surplus in the fully pooling continuation equilibrium.
Proof. Please see the Appendix.
Given the rst-period menu C N P 1 and the nonpartition continuation equilibrium induced by C N P 1 , Lemma 1 says that we can construct two alternative rst-period menus C P 1 1 and C P 2 1 leading to partition continuation equilibria and that the regulator's payo s, the discounted value of the social surplus, can be improved upon by one of our two partition equilibria.
The intuition behind this result comes from the tradeo between production e ciency and information rent. O ering more contracts in the rst period allows the regulator to learn the rm's type better, and consequently alleviates the e ciency distortion in the second period. To do this, however, the regulator needs to pay a higher information rent to the high-type rm for revealing its type. The fully pooling continuation equilibrium does not separate types, and hence it has the highest e ciency distortion in the second period. The regulator, however, does not need to pay the information rent in the rst period. Contrary to the fully pooling continuation equilibrium, the nonpartition continuation equilibrium allows the regulator to partially separate types by sorting some low types out and to alleviate the e ciency distortion in the second period. If the nonpartition continuation equilibrium dominates the fully pooling continuation equilibrium in the sense that it has a higher discounted social surplus, then the bene t from alleviating the e ciency distortion is larger than the cost of separating types in the rst period. In this case, the rst partition continuation equilibrium, which separates types further, should dominate the nonpartition continuation equilibrium. Furthermore, it is not hard to see from the proof in the Appendix that Lemma 1 holds for any interval
[ ; ] with a uniform distribution. Hence the nonpartition continuation equilibrium is suboptimal even for small uncertainty. Undoubtedly our result relies a good deal on the quadratic structure of the social welfare function, but at least in this speci c example we gain intuition into why a nonpartition continuation equilibrium could be dominated by a partition continuation equilibrium. The following proposition states our result formally.
Proposition 3
Whether the uncertainty is small or not, one of two partition continuation equilibria, induced by C P 1 1 or C P 2 1 ; yields a higher payo for the principal than the nonpartition continuation equilibrium induced by C N P 1 . Hence La ont and Tirole's menu of contracts, giving rise to a nonpartition continuation equilibrium, is not optimal.
The di culty in fully characterizing the set of equilibria arises from the complexity of the partition on the type space induced by arbitrary C 1 . As mentioned earlier, if
we are able to show that the optimal contract induces a partition continuation equilibrium, solving for the optimal contract is possible (see [1, 5] ). There are two possible approaches to deal with this issue. First, we can attempt to show that for any nonpartition continuation equilibrium there exists a partition continuation equilibrium that dominates this nonpartition continuation equilibrium as we did above. Alternatively, we can construct a sequence of partition continuation equilibria that approximates this nonpartition continuation equilibrium, making it reasonable for us to search for the optimal contract within the class of partition equilibria. Second, we notice that a nonpartition continuation equilibrium emerges as the result of the multiplicity of intersections of value functions with di erent contracts in C 1 : To be precise, suppose we have a nonpartition continuation equilibrium with the partition fA( )g 2[ ; ] induced by C 1 ; and the principal chooses second-period contracts optimally in each segment A( ): Given this, a value function for some contract (s; c) in C 1 is the locus between the agent's type and the maximum discounted sum of utilities that he can get conditional on (s; c) being chosen by in the rst period. Since it is a nonpartition continuation equilibrium, we must have two value functions associated with two contracts in C 1 with multiple intersections.
In other words, we can say that the \dynamic" single crossing condition fails in nonpartition continuation equilibria. In this regard, perhaps we can eschew the di culty of fully characterizing the set of equilibria by imposing a condition on the agent's objective function to guarantee that the dynamic single crossing condition holds. In that case, any continuation equilibrium induced by any C 1 is partitional, and hence we can search for the optimal contract within the class of partition equilibria.
Conclusion
For the speci c example constructed by La ont and Tirole [3] , we show that, whether uncertainty is small or not, their nonpartition continuation equilibrium is not optimal.
It is still unclear, however, whether an equilibrium is partitional in the general dynamic contracting problem without commitment, and work remains to be done to search for the optimal contract. We plan to pursue this line of research in the future.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we derive the discounted value of the social surplus for each continuation equilibrium. We then calculate the social surplus di erences W N P With the use of (i) in Proposition 1, we can get Now let f P and e f P denote the posterior densities given that c and e c have been chosen in the rst period. We have: 
16 Let e P 1 ( ) and e e P 1 ( ) denote the regulator's optimal incentive schemes in the second period for the rm choosing c and e c repectively. Applying (ii) in Proposition 1, we get e P 1 ( ) = 1 1 + ( ); 2 [ ; e ] (10)
With the use of (i) in Proposition 1, we can get
[u (1 + )( (e e P 1 ( )) + e e P 1 ( )) 0 (e e P 1 ( ))( e )]d g (III) Derive W P 2 1 + W P 2 2 : By construction, s = ( c) 2
2
: Since all types choose the same contract, the posterior density is equal to the prior density. Let e P 2 ( ) denote the regulator's optimal incentive scheme in the second period. Applying (ii) in Proposition 1 we get
+ R [u (1 + )( (e P 2 ( )) + e P 2 ( )) 0 (e P 2 ( ))( )]d (IV) Calculate the di erence W N P 1 W P 1 1 : To make the calculation clear, we divide it into several steps:
(i) First we notice that
( e e c) 2 2 + 2 ( e je c) ( c) 2 2 (13) = 2 e c 2 e c + 2 e e c + 2 c 2 + 2 ( e je c)
(ii) Applying the envelope theorem gives us 0 2 ( je c) = 0 (e e P 1 ( )) = e e P 1 ( ): (iv) Using results (i)-(iii), the rst-period social surplus di erence W N P [(1 + )( (e ( )) e ( )) + 0 (e ( ))( e )]d ] R e 0 (e ( ))( e )d
Since R e [(1 + )( (e e ( )) e e ( )) + 0 (e e ( ))( e )] [(1 + )( (e ( )) e ( )) + 0 (e ( ))( = R e [(1 + )( (e P 2 ( )) e P 2 ( )) + 0 (e P 2 ( ))( )]d R e [(1 + )( (e ( )) e ( ))g + 0 (e ( ))( e + ( e )g)]d R e [(1 + )( (e e ( )) e e ( ))(1 g) + 0 (e e ( ))( 
